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iOH REVOLUTIONS
Civil confusions often spring from trifles but decide great 
issues*
-Aristotle (384-322 B.C.)
Revolutions are ambiguous things. Their success is generally 
proportionate to their power of adaption and to be 
reabsorbed within them of what they rebelled against.
- George Santayana
How a minority, / Reaching majority, / seising authority, / 
Hates a minority*
- Leonard H. Robbins
Remember always that all of us, and you and I especially, 
are descended fran migrants and revolutionists.
- Franklin D. Roosevelt
Those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make 
violent revolution inevitable.
- John F. Kennedy
Sentir en lo mds hondo, cualquier injusticia cometida
contra cualquiera en cualquier parte del mundo, es la 
cualidad mds linda de un revolucionario.
- Che Guevara
ii
Tha export of Revolution ie noneenae. tvery eountry mekeg 
ite own revolution if it wente to, end if it does not 
want to, there will be no revolution.
- Joseph Stalin
ill
Preface
Perhaps no region of the world has so poignantly 
captured the media's attention as Central America. We are 
informed daily with new political developments. It is there­
fore difficult to understand what this area means to us as 
Americans. Many pundits have observed that political and 
social instability are the fundamental characteristics of 
Latin society. While this is true per se, it does not get 
to the root of the problem. Historical analysis is the best 
tool for understanding the true nature of the problem.
Through use of historical analogy from Cuba to Nicaragua, I 
hope to make some sense from all the confusion.
The frequent comparison of Vietnam to Central America 
is tenuous and limiting because, culturally and geographically 
speaking, Asia has little in common with Latin America. The 
present day situation is best understood if we examine our 
own history vis-fi-vis Latin America. An analogy of the 
Nicaraguan and Cuban revolutions will make one issue crystal 
clear: history never repeats itself, but the form flows from
one generation to the next. Thus, although the substwsee of 
Reagan's trade embargo (see Notes) on Nicaragua differs from 
the pressure Eisenhower applied on Cuba, the meaning of such 
actions is remarkably similar. Subtleties of diplomacy and 
negotiation were scrapped in favor of aggressive intimidation.
%
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I would like to thank John Wilcox, my friends, and 
parents, for their patience and advice as I was writing this 
paper* I will dedicate this paper to all the American 
peoples. For better or worse, we inexorably influence and 
give shape to our rich and complex societies.
1The triumphant Cuban Revolution sent shock waves 
through the North American political and business establish­
ments. This was not an ordinary Latin American palace Revo­
lution. uba was undergoing a people's uprising. How would 
their neighbors in the north react?
If the United States government could no longer 
dominate the political and economic structures in Cuba, where 
U.S. interests had always had a de facto control over the 
decision making process, what would be the consequences 
throughout Latin America? What would be the implications 
in Central America, the world's most tightly integrated 
region in the United States economic and security system 
(La Feber 18)? And how would the Soviet Union, now ready to 
challenge the Monroe Doctrine in the name of "proletarian 
revolution," complicate an already unstable situation?
Cold war politics was an obvious result of bringing 
the East-West conflict to the rebellious nations of the 
Caribbean Basin.* The roots of revolution in countries as 
diverse as Cuba and Nicaragua have been obscured and sub­
ordinated by the establishment in favor of explaining the 
events on an East-West axis. Socio-economic theories of 
unrest are subordinated to cold war rhetoric; that is to say, 
revolutionary activity in Nicaragua, as was in the case of 
Cuba, is a consequence of Moscow's blueprint for world 
domination.
2The first half of this paper will examine U.S. 
relations with Castro's Cuba in the incipient years of the 
Revolution. The second part, through use of analogy to the 
Cuban example, will deal with the Sandinista Revolution.
The focus will concentrate on ideological and diplomatic 
perspectives of both Latin countries. An emphasis will be 
placed on power politics of the United States and the Soviet 
Union.
The Cuban struggle was a most salient example of a 
third world country fighting against its status as a colony.
An understanding of U.S.-Soviet reaction to the Cuban chal­
lenge will make present day U.S. policy in Nicaragua more 
clear.
A. History
The roots of Cuban nationalism can be traced to the 
Ten Years War of 1868-1878 against Spain (Suchlich 29).
After renewed struggle in 1895, Cuba attained victory three 
years later. Ironically, the victory was paralleled by 
United States intervention. Thus, Cuba had not won its 
independence alone nor was it to be free of an increasingly 
aggressive U.S. foreign policy. In the minds of many Cubans, 
the U.S. replaced Spain in a more modern relationship of 
mother to colony (29).
After Spanish troops evacuated the Cuban island in 
1899, American troops landed and began the job of pacification.
3On March 1, 1901, the Cuban Constitutional Convention was 
handed a set of articles known as the Platt Amendment. All 
the articles in the Matt Amendment were restrictions on the 
national sovereignty of Cuba (Huberman, Sweezy 14). The 
U.S. exercised the right to intervene for the preservation 
of Cuban independence. A condition to this amendment 
obligated Cuba to, "sell or lease to the United States the 
land necessary for coaling or naval stations, at certain 
specified points to be agreed upon with the President of 
the United States."
Contracts were negotiated with U.S. interests in mind, 
thus providing for a favorable business climate for North 
American capitalists. The United States gradually acquired 
a free hand in almost all economic affairs. Cuba bought 
not only automobiles, machinery, chemical products, paper 
and clothing, but also rice and beans, garlic and onions, 
fats, moat, and cotton— all from the United States (Galeano 
85) .
To many Cubans, the Platt Amendment was the "coyunda 
insorportable"— the yoke of colonialism. Through no choice 
of their own, Cubans had lost the right to rule themselves.
But Cuban nationalists would not forget the struggle that 
had begun in the 1860s for true national sovereignty; the 
1958 revolution is in keeping with this long tradition of 
ever frustrated Cuban revolutionary nationalism and it con­
stitutes the culminating stage of this tradition (Levesque 
30) .
4B. Domestic Problems
Besides de facto foreign domination, another key to
understanding Cuba before 1959 was the extent of poverty and
illiteracy throughout the country. In 1953, for example, one
out of every four persons over ten years of age could not read
or write (Huberman, Sweezy 6). In Batista's Cuba there were
just not enough schools to do the teaching. Lack of education
usually meant condemning peasants to a life of poverty. A
2"normal” unemployment rate was at twenty-five percent.
The fundamental problem with the economy was sugar. 
Cuba existed on a dangerous monoculture system, with a 
reliance on this one crop. Two-thirds of all agricultural 
income derived from sugar (Thomas 369). As Eduardo Galeano 
noted in Open Veins of Latin America, Cuba's economy always 
moved in step with its sugar harvest— the Zafra. Sugar was 
only grown seasonally and foreign markets were not able to 
absorb all that could be produced. The fluctuating price of 
sugar added to the unstable nature of the Cuban economy.
Jose Marti summed up Cuba's situation as early as 1883s "A 
people commits suicide the day on which it bases it existence 
on a single crop" (Huberman, Sweezy 10). When the Zafra was 
over, many Cubans were left destitute, with no skills or edu­
cation to find other employment.
Thus, by 1959 Cuba was locked in a vicious cycle of 
foreign domination and economic stagnation. Americans owned 
eighty percent of Cuban utilities, forty percent of its
5sugar, ninety percent of its mining wealth, and occupied the 
key strategic location of Guantanamo; in other words, Cuba's 
bargaining power vis-a-vis the United States was practically 
nil. In Cuba itself, graft and corruption were widespread.
It has been estimated that Batista managed to steal up to 
four hundred million dollars (Huberman, Sweezy 59)•
C. Road to Revolution
Fidel Castro, a young middle class lawyer from Havana, 
emerged as the leader willing to take action against an 
arbitrary and repressive regime. Successful third world 
revolutions in Africa and Asia may have had an impact on 
Castro in that he now saw the ripe opportunity for a success­
ful nationalist revolution in Cuba.
The first attack on Moncada ended in defeat for the 
rebels. However, this 'moral blow' against the regime 
aroused the spirit of resistance to the Batista tyranny.
The 26th of July movement was led by Castro; he had no 
specific ideology but he was sure of one thing. This move­
ment repudiated three decades of Cuban history and develop­
ment closely identified with the American role in Cuba 
(Huberman, Sweezy 205)•
Castro, by now a member of the Partido Socialists, 
was put in jail by the Batista forces. Although Castro was 
a member of the Communist party in Cuba, he broke with Moscow 
doctrine in two important ways. First, he did not rigorously
3adhere to party discipline or dogma. Secondly, he believed
6that only through armed battle could the struggle be won.
By contrast, Mowcow believed that the first step was the 
cultivation of a Socialist party, who would raise the revo­
lutionary consciousness of the proletariat. The struggle 
was to be fought peacefully and within the system. The
Soviets would not back Castro in any way until it was clear
4that he could consolidate power.
Castro took the stand on his own behalf; his defense 
was aimed at attacking the Batista regime. "History will 
absolve me" soon was lauded as a basic document in the Castro 
revolutionary plan (Langley 1).
It should be pointed out that in 1953 Castro under­
stood what his revolution was about, but he did not clearly 
see the road to such change that would allow him to achieve 
these goals. In his now famous defense plea, Castro outlined 
the goals of his movement;
The problems concerning land, the problem of 
industrialization, the problem of housing, the 
problem of unemployment, the problem of education 
and the problem of the health of the people; these 
are the six problems we would take steps to resolve, 
along with the restoration of public liberties and 
political democracy (4).
There is no validity to the claim that Castro began 
as a communist faithful to Marxist-Leninist tradition. Che 
Guevara did not believe the 26th of July had any strong 
ideological message either. In 1964, when asked whether in 
the Sierra Maestra he had foreseen that the Cuban revolution 
would take so radical a direction, he answered:
7Intuitively I felt it. Of course the direction, and 
the very violent development of the revolution could 
not have been forseen. Nor was the Marxist-Leninist 
formulation forseeable . . .  We had a more or less 
vague idea of solving problems which we saw clearly 
affected the peasants who fought with us and the 
problems we saw in the lives of the worker (Thomas 
267) .
But U.S. officials seemed less concerned with Cuba's desire 
to change their socio-economic position.
Policy makers avoided the real issue at hands the 
force for change was indigenous, with a concept linking 
Cuba of 1959 with that of 1868, comprehending the struggle 
for freedom by slaves, by criollos against Spaniards, by 
Cubans against the U.S, Before 1959 Castro had no ideology, 
even if he coveted one privately. All was vague and heroic 
(Thomas 274).
D. U.S. Perspectives
Castro informed American audiences that his program 
for Cuba went beyond merely ridding the country of Batista. 
"Cuba earnestly desires a radical change in every field of 
its public and social life. The people must be given some­
thing more than liberty and democracy in abstract terms" 
(Kuberman, Sweezy 50). But would the U.S. tolerate a radical 
change, socialist in nature, in the strategically important 
Caribbean Basin?
In the U.S., certain indications suggest that 
political leaders tacitly approved the overthrow of Batista 
in favor of a moderate reformer. Batista himself later
8claimed in exile that the Castro movement was gaining 
strength "by leaps and bounds" with the consistent support 
of the United States government and a dominant sector of 
the American press. As Batista saw the situation by 1958, 
"the American arms embargo on my government was generally 
interpreted as a decision by Washington to support Castro’s 
drive for power" (Langley 10). Batista was correct. The 
terrorists' attacks were more and more successful.
Che Guevara and Colona Bayo led staunch guerilla 
warfare which carried on effective sabotage all over the 
island. By January 2 of the new year Castro's army of 
campesinos marched into Santiago and accepted the uncondi­
tional surrender of the Batista forces at Ft. Moncada. The 
change of power would now be influenced by three main 
actors: The U.S., who stood to lose a decisive hegomony
over Cuba that they had enjoyed for nearly six decades; the 
Cubans, who were now in a position to directly challenge U.S. 
domination; and the Soviet Union, too confident in itself to 
merely watch and not participate in this third world struggle 
so close to the United States. Soviet perspectives must be 
analyzed to determine if the Cuban revolution, as alleged 
by U.S. officials, was indeed a communist conspiracy.
E. Soviet Perspectives
For the Soviets at the time of the Castroite vic­
tory, Latin America was last on the list of Soviet hopes for 
revolution in the third world (Levesque 5). Most of the
Latin governments were solidly tied to the United States, 
U.S. economic penetration was incomparably stronger there 
than anywhere else in the third world. Consequently, for 
the Soviet Union the primary efforts of the Latin American 
Communist Parties were not to be directed toward the 
struggle for socialism, but rather toward the struggle to 
establish and broaden bourgeois democracy, which would in 
turn plant the seeds of its own destruction (Levesque 5).
Soviet leaders in 1959 viewed Castro with guarded 
optimism. They had never made inroads in a country without 
arming the rebels. European experience taught Moscow that 
a developed Communist party and armed support were impera­
tive for victory, Castro came to power without a clear 
vision of tactics and without Soviet aid. In reading the 
Soviet press for the greater part of 1959, one is struck by 
the absence of any mention of Soviet support of Cuba or 
promises of support, even merely political support (Levesque 
9). This is understandable because the Soviets would make 
no promises until they saw realistic hope of Castro's regime 
surviving.
George Kennan, an expert on Soviet-American relation
summarized Soviet intentions with particular eloquences
. . . Despite all that is said about Soviet expansion, 
the power of the Kremlin extends precisely to those 
areas which it is able to dominate with its own armed 
forces, without involving impossible lines of communi­
cation, and no farther. There are geographic limits 
to military occupation (276).
10
A realistic assessment of Soviet strength and ambition was 
difficult to find in the late fifties. Clearly, the Soviets 
felt no intimacy with the Latin people.
The extreme caution revealed in Soviet texts can be 
explained by the Soviet leaders' desire not to make an 
open-ended commitment to an unstable regime in an area so 
far away from their real security threat and so close to 
U.S. force. However, U.S. attitudes would not be as con­
servative. The U.S. was accustomed to always having their 
way in Latin America, and Castro would not be the exception. 
It was the U.S. response to the Cuban challenge that ulti­
mately determined the tone and future course of the revolu­
tion.
Castro in January of 1959 was a radical nationalist, 
willing or anxious to use 'revolutionary' methods to achieve 
his ends, but uncertain of the precise nature of those ends, 
or their practicality and the wisest way of realizing them 
(Thomas 273). As of April 1959 Castro was a popular hero 
among the American people. But the President did not meet 
with him during his April visit. When Castro returned to 
Havana, the diplomatic situation deteriorated.
The American government voiced anger at the trials 
of former Batista henchmen, and the U.S. firmly opposed 
Castro's nationalization laws, whereby foreign-owned com­
panies were forced to submit to Cuban control, with no 
promise of compensation.
11
F. Diplomatic Situation
Eisenhower criticized Castro's April trade agree­
ments with the Soviet Union, an exchange of promises which 
can hardly be considered a major Soviet commitment to Castro, 
This economic agreement arranged for the Soviet Union to 
purchase 170,000 tons of Cuban sugar, which was less than 
it had purchased the previous year from the Batista regime 
(Levesque 13).
What probably alarmed U.S. officials most was the 
Mikoyan ten-day visit to Cuba in which $100 million credit 
was qiven to Cuba for the purchase of industrial equipment, 
and an arrangement by the Soviets to purchase 425,000 tons 
of sugar in 1960 and one-mi.liion tons for the next four 
years. Thus, Cuba had become increasingly important to 
Soviet leaders. But it was the U.S. who accelerated events, 
thereby hastening the radicalization of Castro.
The first act on the part of the U.S. was to cut by 
700,000 tons the sugar quota it had committed itself to buy 
from Cuba. The summer of 1960 marked a turning point: Cuba
was on the fringe of the Socialist camp. It was the U.S. 
leaders who pushed them there.
Eisenhower terminated diplomatic relations with Cuba 
on January 3, 1961. Secret plans to train and equip Cuban 
exiles for an invasion of the island were already well under 
way. At this point, U.N. meetings were dominated by the 
Cuban issue. Raul Roa claimed that there would be an
12
imminent military attack carried out by the United States
. 5against the government and people of Cuba,
The American government responded in a Department of 
State bulletin on January 23, 1961, which asserted that 
Castro had plunged his country into "subversive and military 
activity which is far beyond the resources of Cuba acting 
alone , . . putting that unhappy country more and more into 
the hands of international communism,"
Ironically, although Castro was publicly explaining 
that he was not a Soviet puppet, the U.S. insisted on 
explaining events in Cuba as a result of communist infiltra­
tion, which had the impact of challenging Cuba to prove where 
it stood, John F, Kennedy, the new chief executive on 
January 20, 1961, would not alter the U.S. determination to 
find a moderate alternative to Castro, who was clearly a 
leftist-type dictator in their eyes.
G. Invasion
The ill-advised invasion at the Bahia de los Cochinos 
in April of 1961 failed to promote U.S. initiative and 
reinforced what U.S. leaders had feared most: Castro's
consolidation of power. Relations between Cuba and the 
United States were at its worst point. The State Department 
now referred to the transformation of Cuba into a Soviet 
satellite (Levesque 41). Khrushchev had already promised 
in a figurative sense Soviet artillerymen to the Cuban 
people by missile fire (17). Arkady Shevchenko, the
13
highest-ranking Soviet diplomat to break with Moscow since 
World War II, described the inner workings of the Kremlin in 
the early sixties. **
To the Soviets, Castro became a beacon of hope for 
socialism in Latin America. Khrushchev believed that the 
U.S. was actually helping promote Soviet policy. He said 
that instead of establishing normal relations with Cuba, 
the U.S. was doing all it could to drive Castro to the wall 
by organizing a campaign against him, stirring up the Latin 
American countries, and imposing an economic blockade on 
Cuba. Khrushchev felt this was not a prudent move by the 
United States. "It is a result of the howels of zealous 
anti-convnunists in the U.S. who see red everywhere# though 
possibly something is only rose-colored or even white"
(Time, Feb. 11, 1985, p. 52). Castro would gravitate to the 
Soviets like an iron filing to a magnet. Cuba was now a 
'heated' cold war issue.
How would U.S. leaders tolerate a leftist socialist 
camp moving to within several miles of its coast? The 
answer is that they would not tolerate such a change without 
continuing efforts to destabilize the Castro regime.
There was a provision added in August of 1962 to 
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 which declared, "no 
assistance shall be furnished to any communist country • • • 
unless such assistance is vital to the United States." In 
the early months of 1963 the minister of foreign affairs of
14
all the American republics excluded Cuba from the 
Cuba was thus isolated from the system it had been his­
torically so much a part of. The Soviet Union left Castro 
the only real escape hatch.
H. Soviet Penetration
Soviet aid would insure his survival as a viable 
government. He turned to communism as a result of foreign 
aggression and domestic crisis. Three fundamental necessi­
ties forced Castro into the Communist camp: first was his
fear of American foreign policy, which Castro accurately 
believed opposed his revolution; second, he needed to 
organize popular support for his revolution through 
organized labor; third, was his belief that communism pro­
vided the answer to Cuba's socio-economic problems (Ruiz 
116)• The Soviet Union furnished Castro with a grand 
opportunity to escape American hegemony in the western 
hemisphere. Khrushchev had already promised aid. "The 
Soviet Union will not abandon the Cuban people in the time 
of trouble nor will it refuse it all necessary aid and 
support (Langley 43).
Aid came from the Soviets not only in oil and tech­
nical assistance but in twenty IRBM missiles. The reason 
for sending missiles is not all that clear, but in 
Khrushchev's own words, "Our aim was to defend Cuba."
The Cuban Missile Crisis speech of October 22, 1962 
and the quarantine on Cuba witnessed the most dangerous hours
7
15
of the cold war. This crisis was resolved when the U.S.S.R. 
agreed to remove the missiles upon condition that the U.S. 
(a) remove quarantine measures and (b) give assurances 
against an invasion of Cuba (Langley 60). By December of 
1962 Castro defiantly remarked, MI shall be a Marxist- 
Leninist until the last day of my life" (Levesque 31).
Khrushchev did his best to convert this diplomatic 
humiliation over Cuba into a victory. Aside from his boast 
that they had preserved peace, he had gains to show: the
United States, by being brought to confine its objective to 
the withdrawal of Soviet missiles, scrapped the Monroe 
Doctrine, and Cuba remained both free from the threat of 
invasion and intact as a base for communist subversion 
throughout the western hemisphere. In the final analysis, 
Cuba was manipulated by the Soviets in the context of world
Q
politics.
Conclusion
By limiting its analysis to a communist conspiracy, 
U.S. leaders tragically compelled Castro to turn to Moscow 
(Williams, United States 63). Without U.S. aid or even 
support, Cuba required the Soviet connection to fund an 
economic growth and redistribution program (Dominguez 84). 
Castro’s radical inclination crystallized because of U.S. 
intransigence to change. Cuba was fighting a nationalist, 
anti-colonial revolution. But the U.S. apparently forgot 
that the American Revolution was the first anti-colonial
16
struggle for sovereignty. Instead of supporting constructive 
change, v/e opted for blaming the Soviets as the "root of all 
evil.”
But the facts do not strengthen this point of view. 
The Soviets did indeed encourage and stimulate third world 
revolution in Africa and Asia, but up until 1959, Soviet 
efforts in Latin America were practically nil. Blaming 
instability on Moscow is ludicrous in view of the fact that 
U.S. imperialism was the dominant force shaping Latin 
America since 1898.
II. PART TWO
Introduction
For two decades since 1959, the hemispheric policy 
of the United States has been haunted by the spector of 
•another Cuba.' The fear that Cuba's revolutionary upheaval 
might be repeated elsewhere justified providing counter­
insurgency assistance to a continent increasingly dominated 
by a military-oligarchy dictatorship. The collapse of the 
Somoza dynasty in July of 1979 has made this fear more 
palpable than ever. The Sandinista Revolution had led many 
to believe that we are facing a situation similar to the 
Cuban Revolution. The remainder of this paper will examine 
this question.
Before comparing the Nicaraguan situation with Cuba, 
it must be pointed out that these two revolutions are not
17
any more the same than the French was to the American, or 
the Chinese to the Russian, Washington's propensity for 
explaining revolutions as dominoes forgets to mention that 
once you push over the first domino the others will all fall 
quickly subsequently thereafter. This did not happen in Asia, 
nor did it happen in Latin America after Castro.^ Michael 
Harrington, a successor to Eugene Debs's Socialist Party, 
explains why the Moscow "hit list" theory is fallacious 
reasoning: "Revolutionary movements are never exactly
alike? they are not in other words, uniform entities that 
might be called dominoes (Harrington 298).
Whether Nicaragua becomes another Cuba will depend in 
large part on whether the United States continues to make the 
same mistakes it made twenty years ago, when it chose 
economic and military destabilization over the more prudent 
policy of diplomatic accommodation.
A. History
Nicaragua, like Cuba, was victimized early in the 
century by the new "Manifest Destiny" which guided U.S. 
hemispheric policy (LeoGrande 29). It became a protectorate 
of the United States in 1912 when the marines were dispatched 
ostensibly to protect American property and citizens during 
a period of civil strife. Our interests in Nicaragua were 
primarily strategic in nature (LeoGrande 29). For a long 
time it was considered a possible sight for a canal across 
the isthmus. When a canal was finally built in Panama
18
Nicaragua remained strategically important to its defense.
The U.S. marines were the force until 1933.
But in 1927 a battle broke out that would change the
*
flow of Nicaraguan history. Adolfo Diaz was picked to be 
President by the United States ambassador. Augusto Cesar 
Sandino, a general of the Liberal Party, refused to accept 
the imposition of a conservative U.S. backed president. For 
nearly six years he fought a guerilla war against the marines, 
achieving international stature as a nationalist and anti­
imperialist (LeoGrande 29). 'El padre de la revolucidn anti- 
imperialista* explained his cause in simple language.
El hombre que de su patria no exige mSs que un palmo 
de tierra para su sepultura, merece ser oido, y no 
s6lo oido sino tambiin creldo (Pensamiento 33).
In other words, the campesinos' power was to be taken
seriously.
When the U.S. withdrew its troops' 'physical' 
presence in the name of the "good neighbor", it left the 
task of insuring stability to the American trained National 
Guard under the command of Anastasio Somoza Garcia. In 
1934 Somoza ordered Sandino shot. Two years later he forced 
the civilian president from office, arranged for his own 
election, and then began a family dynasty which ruled 
Nicaragua for forty-three years with the backing of the 
National Guard and the support of the United States.
Somoza may have been a "son-of-a-bitch" but at least he was 
ours.*^ As Walter LaFeber so aptly put it in his excellent
19
book, Inevitable Revolutions# no regime cooperated more 
fully with the United States than did the Somozas between 
1930 and late seventies, and no Central American nation 
has more directly challenged U.S. polio lad Ih the area 
them the post-1979 Nicaraguan government 111),
B. Road to Revolution
The 1960s in Nicaragua saw unprecedented growth) 
seven to eight percent economic growth at the expense of 
social progress was the price they paid. After the '67 
’mock* elections, hopes for political reform dashed. The 
successful Cuban Revolution had already inspired the creation 
of the F.S.L.N. in 1962 (('rente Sandinista de Liberacion 
Nacional). The experience of the Sierra in Cuba proved that 
a small group of resolute men could conquer a regular army.
The 1972 earthquake served as a catalyst bringing 
about iomoaa's ultimate downfall. Managua war demolished, 
U,S« atd was supposed to be used to rebuild the city but 
instead ended up enriching the Somoza group. As director 
of the National Guard, Somoza ruled Nicaragua by decree.
His personal wealth in 1974 had been estimated at $400 
million (Booth 81). He also owned: one-fifth of the land;
three of six sugar mills; one hundred and sixty-eight 
factories, or twenty-five percent of industry.
By 1974 the F.S.L.N.'s guerilla organization had 
fewer than one hundred members but still managed to launch 
the successful Christmas operation which brought the F.S.L.N.
12
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national recognition just as Castro's abortive attempt in 
'53 had elevated his stature. The National Guard responded 
with a state of seige, terrorizing the northern areas of 
Matagalpa, Zelaya, and Segovia. So when Carter opened his 
Human Rights Policy in 1977, Nicaragua became one of its 
principal targets. Military aid was cut off.
C . U.S. Perspectives
Carter himself knew that greed and repression had 
gone too far; he was not interested in maintaining Somoza.
By late *79 Carter saw Somoza's departure as a key to 
political transition. But as with the Cuban example, the 
U.S. feared a takeover by the left (LeFeber 293). Carter 
wanted change without revolution but he had no policy to 
prevent revolutionary situations from erupting. This type 
of thinking was bound to produce a timid, inconsistent 
policy. Carter's hope was to coerce the leaders by support­
ing more moderate elements within the Revolution. Aid was 
given to the regime in power, but Carter wanted to keep the 
National Guard in business until the Nicaraguan elections. 
This move by Carter ironically alienated the moderates he had 
hoped to sv/ay. The small group of 'reformers' were easily 
identified and subordinated to insignificant posts.
The Reagan administration inherited this political 
situation; Reagan continued Carter's policy of increased 
military aid to El Salvador, but he broke sharply with 
Carter over Nicaragua. President Reagan has placed our
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priorities back to the assumptions of the fifties and si. s? 
that is to say, detdnte has given way to a new cold war.
Reagan saw the Soviets as the conspirators of the Nicaraguan 
Revolution: "Should we allow Grenada, Nicaragua, El Salva­
dor to become 'new Cubas,' new staging grounds for Soviet 
combat brigades?" (Maira 43). This hostile attitude has had 
the impact of a self-fulfilling prophesy— we look at any 
evidence, no matter how trite and frivolous, as confirmations 
of our suspicions. Thus, we actually precipitate the behavior 
we expect.
President Reagan could not tolerate the advent of a 
leftist regime while he was in control. As with Kennedy, 
Reagan uses the argument of a national security threat as a 
justification for destabilization efforts in the Caribbean.
And once again nobody bothered to explain how our vital 
national interests were being directly threatened. How then 
do you justify such stress on a military approach when our 
vital interests are not at stake? Well, the Reagan 
Administration has done this by viewing third world revolu­
tions as a part of the broader Soviet challenge.
This policy dates back to National Security Council 
document No. 68, or NSC-68 drawn up in 1950 (Baruch p. 6).
This document argues that the United States cannot accept 
disorder in the world at large. The Soviets were seen as 
the principle cause of instability, and from this type of 
mindset emerges the idea that we have a moral obligation to
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stop the Soviet force on every 'front.1 Thus, Reagan policy 
in Nicaragua is consistent with the containment policies of 
LBJ, JFK, Ike, and Truman. A tragedy of American diplomacy 
is that we have failed to change our assumptions to the 
changing needs of the third world. Our leaders hold stead* 
fast to antiquated 'logic' even though the countries we deal 
with are not affected by the same type of world that Truman 
and Kennan had seen in the late 1940s and early 1950s.
This re-birth of a cold war mentality under Reagan 
has led inexorably to the radicalization of the Nicaraguan 
leaders, just as in Cuba, when it found itself challenged 
by U.S. cold war diplomacy.
D. Ideology
The F.S.L.N. leaders were not leading a movement
directed by Moscow and Cuba. The principles of "Pensamiento
Sandinista" were really directed against the forces of
'yanqui imperialism.' A fragment from a charla, "Sandino:
clase e ideologia," will convey this sentiment.
*  >w
De ahi en adelante nosotros podriamos senalar 
tres rasgos fundamentales del pensamiento sandinista: 
primero, su caricter imperialists. Segundo, su 
cardcter antiolig£rquico. Y tercero, y como 
consecuencia, su concepto de la justicia social 
(Pensamiento Sandinista 59).
Seen along these same lines, Nicaragua, as with Cuba, was 
motivated in an attempt to repudiate decades of U.S. domina­
tion.
The F.S.L.N, platform was not a communist doctrine 
for change. The program of 1979 echoed the same type of
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problems which Castro experienced in *53 and hoped to 
resolve. "Improve rural working conditions? free unioniza­
tion for all workers? improve public health care; improve 
education with an emphasis on literacy." This latter item 
would provide the peasants with the tools and the culture 
necessary if they were to be an educated asset to the revo­
lution. Of course, literacy per se can be meaningless if 
not accompanied by a free press and tolerant government.^
The new regime advocated for a mixed economy, a 
non-aligned foreign policy, free press, democratic elections? 
elimination of crime, delinquency, corruption? nationalization 
of the Somozas* and their cohorts* goods and property 
(Booth 147), All in all, it was an enormous task for such a 
young group of politicians. Once again, pressure from 
Washington would accelerate events.
£• Diplomacy
Government aid promised earlier by Carter was with­
held while destabilization efforts were put into action by 
the C.I.A. Covert action with a $19 million budget was 
officially admitted to the C.I.A, directly as early as 1981 
(LaPeber 296). The Nicaraguan Democratic Force, known in 
the U.S.A. as Contras, received most of the $80 million the 
C.I.A. spent on the war until financing was ended in June of 
*84.
More recently (Hay, 1985), President Reagan*s pledge to 
use $14 million in aid to Nicaraguan rebels for "humanitarian
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purposes'* was approved by a Senate vote of 53 to 46. None­
theless, he fell two votes short in the House, 215 to 213, 
to provide direct aid to the rebels. Military and material 
support for the Contras has become a hot domestic issue.
So important, in fact, the Washington Times announced May 7, 
1985 that it would try to raise privately the $14 million 
rejected by Congress. Clearly, Reagan would prefer to see 
Congress behind him, and not have to rely on private organi­
zations.
As of writing, U.S. aid or none, ex-Somoza henchmen 
are presently waging a civil war against the Sandinista 
government. Washington has opted for a 'big-stick' approach: 
direct assault on the Nicaraguan government instead of 
pursuing diplomatic channels. Military aid to Honduras has 
increased steadily and U.S. destroyers even began to watch 
over the Caribbean. Mining sabotage, a gross violation of 
international law, has also been a technique of the rejuvenated 
C.I.A. Reagan, like Kennedy, cannot recognize that by using 
covert and even overt means against a young inexperienced 
group of politicians, he only brings about a radicalization 
process of those in power leaving the 'middle of the road 
politicians * vulnerable.
Herein lay the tragic irony of our policy in Cuba 
and Nicaragua: although we were looking for a pliable
'reformer,' our tactics were a direct cause in legitimizing 
the revolutionary rule we had hoped to avoid. Fear of inva­
sion will always unite people around its leader.
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At time of writing, the Sandinistas appear to be 
reneging on their earlier promises. That is, to pursue a 
policy of nonalignment, preserve a mixed economy and ensure 
political pluralism. In fact, the Sandinistas have drawn 
closer to Cuba, importing some six thousand health and 
education officers, who have become more and more important 
as accusations of U.S. invasion increase. They have also 
linked themselves closer to Soviet policy.
F. Sandinista Reality
The 60,000 strong army has responded to the policy
of the Reagan Administration by preparing the Nicaraguan
people for civil and foreign war? they continue to receive
supplies from the U.S.S.R., including T-55 tanks (Weber 143).
But even with strong 'reserve battalions' and an effective
territorial militia, the Nicaraguans are 'el imposible
invasor'— their posture is strictly defensive in nature. In
the November 26, 1984 edition of El Pais# Nicaraguan
authorities insisted that they could mobilize only 30,000
troops. Even with Soviet aid, the Nicaraguan army is no
match for U.S. air forces. Moreover, the civil war has
exhausted much of their resources rendering them powerless
to sustain an invasion in any other Central American country.
According to EL PAIS (18 Nov. 5):
En ningun caso, ni por numero de hombres ni por la 
cantidad ni calidad de armamento, estaria en 
condiciones de asumir la ocupacidn de otrcA territorios, 
que cuentan adem&s con la proteccidn del gran aliado 
del Norte.
There simply is no real security threat.
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The recent commotion over the innacurate report of 
Soviet Migs in Nicaraguan territory sounds like a "Deja-vu" 
of the 1963 missile crisis. Once again the United States 
directed its focus on a few major offensive weapons that 
do not tip the forces against U.S. security. From a Soviet 
perspective, the U.S. leaders have again made an issue out 
of offensive weapons, thereby minimizing world criticism of 
their influence and buildup in other areas. After the storm 
passes over, the Soviets will quietly continue to give 
assistance to the Sandinistas, as if the MIG affair had never 
occurred.
Although a diplomatic and political approach would
seem more conducive to a long lasting agreement, Reagan has
consistently justified his military approach using the long
standing NSC-68 as the legal precedent. The Kissinger
Commission provided the political facade of consensus needed
14to implement these policies in the 1980s.
The conmission stated that, "a successful counter­
insurgency . . .  is a necessary condition for a political 
solution" (C. A. Bulletin 8)•
Firstly, it called for increased military aid to 
El Salvador provided that headway be made in improving the 
course of human rights. This was a blow to Reagan, whose 
previous military aid packages, despite congressional 
outcry, made no mention of human rights as a stipulation for 
receiving further aid.
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Secondly, the commission proposed the allocation of 
8 billion dollars in economic aid over the next five years 
for ail the nations in the region. However, Nicaragua can 
receive this aid only if it allows for a rapid democratiza­
tion of the country’s internal and external politic#. All 
terms and conditions will of course be favorable for the 
U.S. In the final analysis, the commission’s military 
solution only serves to reinforce Reagan's truculent 
attitude. Low-key diplomacy has been overlooked.
G. international Sentiment: Contadora
The Latin American nations of Venezuela, Colombia, 
Mexico, Panama, have set the stage for U.S. participation 
in the Contadora process, but the U.S. has been thus far 
unwilling to negotiate in "good faith." Washington has 
rejected the more peaceful proposals of the Contadora group 
and even tried to exclude Nicaragua from economic aid from 
the European Economic Community (El Pais, Oct. 1, 1984).
The original treaty focused on the following topics:
1) No use of one nation's territory to base covert 
actions against another sovereign country.
3) A halt to terrorist and destabilization efforts
3) Return of foreign military advisors to their 
homeland.15
4) Limiting arms purchases to level necessary for 
self-defense•
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5) Control and verification of defense arsenals.
6) Renounce foreign military bases and intervention 
in the region.
These proposals were meant to be followed and carried out 
in the political context ofs
1) representative and pluralist democracies
2) respect for human rights
3) guaranteed amnesty for exiles— allow opposition 
political forces to operate freely within the 
country
4) guaranteed autonomy of judicial powers
5) guaranteed free and open electoral process.
Contadora understands that Europe can play an impor­
tant role in equalizing the influence and actions of the two 
superpowers. Indeed, European pressure may be the only 
force capable of limiting the mistakes of the Reagan admin­
istration.
Washington's European allies have so far refused to 
accept the civil wars in Central America as a mere Soviet- 
Cuban plot# laying stress on their socio-economic roots. 
Perhaps no country has been more solidly behind the diplo­
matic approach than Spain. The Spanish Prime Minister# 
Felipe Gonzalez said on May 4# 1985# that the negotiations 
led by the Contadora group of nations and the negotiations 
with Nicaragua that the United States broke off this year 
were "inseparable" and were the best road to peace in the
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region (N.Y. Times, May 4, 1985, 4). Nevertheless, Reagan, as 
J, F, K. did in Cuba, has succeeded in internationalizing a 
fundamentally internal problem. Managua has been isolated 
from its neighbors in classic cold war fashion. However, 
an invasion does not appear to be the imminent consequence 
of Reagan's military approach.
The nature o f  a war in Central America will make the 
administration think twice before attacking. First of all, 
U.S. armed forces will not be able to quickly isolate 
Nicaragua as they did when surrounding the Cuban island in 
the sixties? a regionalized land war in Central America 
would be a much bloodier affair than Grenada or the Bay of 
Pigs. Secretary of Defense Weinberger recognized this when 
he delivered a speech in late November of 1984 titled, "The 
Uses of Military Powers" (N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1984, p. 1 
& 4) .
In this speech he declared that Washington will
avoid gradual involvement in Latin American wars and that
the United States will not be drawn into combat in Central
America unless our national interests are being directly
16threatened and we have a consensus to a winning policy.
As Weinberger put it, "recent history has proven that we 
cannot assume unilaterally the role of the world's defender 
. . . the commitment of U.S. forces to combat should be a 
last resort . . . and to be used only when other means have 
tailed" (4-5). With regard to Central America, these
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statements are the most realistic to come from Washington 
in four years. Why then has Washington not supported a 
diplomatic ai ch to the situation?
That Washington would encounter staunch domestic and
foreign opposition is another factor which would make an
invasion by U.S. forces unlikely. The world is less bi-
17polarized today than it was for J.F.K. This domestic and 
foreign criticism will make consensus for an invasion dis­
appear, except of course in sectors of the military.
The most important factor to consider is the 1984 
Reagan landslide in which he promised to work for some type 
of arms treaty with the Soviet Union. Reagan might also 
feel the need to go down in history as a peaceful President. 
It is highly unlikely that the United States will seriously 
negotiate with the Soviet Union if they invade Managua, or 
for that matter, San Salvador. Thus, arms reductions talks 
will inject a new pragmatism in Reagan's thinking.
Conclusions; Tragedy of U.S. Diplomacy
But whether or not we invade or just continue the 
covert-overt pressure, the tragedy of U.S. diplomacy is 
clear. William Williams, a widely quoted revisionist 
historian, eloquently explains this tragedy. "The United 
States not only misunderstands revolutions, but we assert 
that anti-colonialism is wrong headed and should be opposed 
in favor of the emu-ation of the American example" (Williams 
278) .
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Another tragedy of American diplomacy is that Reagan, 
by externalizing evil, and by making the Soviets the embodi­
ment of all evil, sees any non-conformity by the people of 
Latin America not as the end product of the miserable con­
ditions in these countries but as some kind of Soviet opera­
tion. In believing that, the Reagan administration is creating 
a self-fulfilling prophesy, just as J.F.K. did with Cuba.
Our reaction to the Cuban and Nicaraguan revolutions is grim 
testimony of this tragedy. Unfortunately, prophesy cannot 
pass for effective foreign policy.
Why should the U.S. continue to view Marxist- 
Leninist ideology as the dominant force in Nicaragua and 
Cuba when history clearly reveaxs that it was yankee 
colonialism that helped precipitate unrest? In the future 
U.S. leaders must accept the fact that the Soviet Union 
will continue to exploit weakness and chaos giving inspira­
tion and direction to communist movements in Latin America.
But there is no reason to fear the Soviets because they will 
continue to respect our clear domination in the western 
hemisphere; besides, they have more pressing problems at 
home, with China, and Eastern Europe. The United States 
will continue to be the "force." We therefore have it 
within our power to reach a peaceful solution.
But before we can act, we must learn from our past 
involvement in Latin America. As writer and intellectual 
Carlos Fuentes advises,
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What we expect of the United States is the loyal 
participation in our Latin American policy of 
shifting power from the army to the people; of 
ending the long rule of the army (El Salvador 389).
But it was Carlos Andres Perfiz, President of Venezuela from
1974-1979, who best understood America's preeminent position
vis-S-vis Latin America (N.Y. Times, May 1, 1985, 27).
. . • Contadora countries, which are attempting to 
negotiate a peaceful solution to the Central American 
conflicts, are confronted by a hostile United States 
Government. The Reagan administration offers 
rhetorical support for the Contadora process but in 
reality seeks to win a military victory and overthrow 
the Sandinista government. It risks widening the war, 
pushing the Sandinista leadership deeper into the 
Soviet-Cuban camp and poisoning relations with its 
democratic allies in Latin America.
Per£z concludes by explaining to Americans what
Vietnam means to Latin America.
. • . That the United States is strongest when it acts 
for social justice and democratic change, that it is 
most effective when it acts multilaterally, and most 
successful when it deals with its neighbors as equals 
dedicated to peace, freedom and democracy (Perez,
N.Y. Times 27).
President Reagan stated in a joint session of Congress 
in April of 1983, "If we cannot defend ourselves in Central 
America we cannot expect to prevail elsewhere” (Chase 45).
This statement underscores the real motivation of our foreign 
policy on a whole: our credibility as a reliable ally would
be at stake if we could not show the world that we are in 
firm control of events in Latin America. But, Mr. Reagan# 
who are we defending ourselves from in Central America? 9 
And are the qualifications of 'credibility1 narrowly limited 
to military criterion?
33
The lesson of Nicaragua and Cuba is clear: true
reform in Latin America is not possible without radical 
changes in society. Preserving the status-quo in the short 
run may be detrimental to our long-term goals. The policy 
should not be how to prevent leftist revolutions or radical 
social change, but rather how to morally and economically 
support the people*s desire for self-determination to rule 
themselves. Soviet rhetoric and actions would be irrelevant 
if the United States lived up to its responsibility as the 
world leader of revolutionary spirit.
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Api^endix A
EL PAIS, lunes 26 4e noviembre dc 1984
— — ---------------- ---- *  ...........  - ............... -  ■ ■ — —
Un complejo m*pa militar. n mapa quc
ofrecemos cMa basado cn Ins datos ofrecidos 
por Military Hahnce junquc sc ban aftadidn 
ot/os informcs I n Nicaragua, por eicmplo, sc 
ofrcec la ctfra dc M hUU hombrcs. uunquc cl 
Pentagono aftrma que son HKMM) > las auton 
dadcs sandimstas iiisisicn cn que pueden muvi 
It/af a MXHiOO ns-r sun as lanto cn II Salvador
crnno en Guatemala ha> que con tar (amhten a 
las fuereas par amilitarcs, dc diftul daMficauon 
Guatemala. por su pane, puede llcpar a contar 
con 7(K MU Ml clcctt vos si sc induven las palrulta.s 
dc autodefensa civil l.n cuanlo a material, 
Washington dcnuncia ststcmaticamcnu* que Ni­
caragua posse dtverso armanictiio sovietico, 
desde avumes Mig a mis lies tu.aj.urv. aunque
PONU
nunca ha sido prohjdo M armamento que I sta* 
dns llnidos ofm e a sus aliados cn la /ona suclc 
ter de alia tcvT*qogia, antique nonvialmcntc va 
dinjpdo escluvrs amentc a las urmlades dc elm 
que amtrolan su% propios ascsorcs C osta Rtea 
sAlo tiene 7 Usi nomhres en las tuenras de segu 
ridad Sc mdua tamhien la preseticia nulita/ es 
tadnumdrnse ' «ub,ina en I* /on*
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Nicaragua: “Life is Triumphing Over DeathM
The Christian base communities of Esteli. located in northern Nicaragua. released a document on Oct 16 fhi* offers 
a summary of the achievements of the five year old Sandmista revolution The document addressed to all Christians was 
released withm the context of national elections, ,<n economy be my severely undermined becau,-e of concerted ♦ 
attacks and continuous threats of a U S military invasion The document seeks to give a more truthful vermn of the rcvolu 
tionary prowess m ordei to <ountci covenige by vunou- news agencies which distorts the sit union in Nicaragua ' where 
lift is tnumphmy ovei death andI justice over injusti e I P has extracted some of the mo>t sigmficant indicators contained 
m the document entitled The Achievements of the Nicaraguan Revolution in Statistics ”
Ii
MUTATION  
Government budget 
Access 
Illiteracy
Primary and Secondary Students 
Community educators 
Universities 
University students 
[ Technical Schools 
Rural education centers
I M l  A  M i l
1 Government Budget 
Medical attention
j Infant Mortality 
; Life expectancy 
j Centers for dehydrated children 
• Teaching hospitals 
Vaccination drives
I Hygiene campaigns 
Health posts 
i Medical consultations 
Med tea? student*
! Clinical and surgical specialists 
: Recognition
BEEORF IH t REVOLUTION
341 million cordoba: 
obligatory enrollment fees 
SO 3 percent (1978) 
871.300 
none 
2
24,000
data unavailable 
data unavailable
AFTER THE REVOLUTION
2 billion cordobas 
free
12 9 percent (1980) 
1.763.065 
22000 
4
35000
14
24
3 percent (1977) 
private consultations
12* per 1.000(1977) 
55 years (1978) 
none
5
none
none
data unavailable 
2 4 million (1977) 
150 
none 
none
11 percent ( 1983)
public iSt\ft t nh .< J i  Sti.’n J  created
immediately after the revolution)
58 per 1.000 
57 years (1982)
40
21
drives carried out by 160.000 volunteer 
health workers
continual
309
6 4 million (1983) j
550
135 !
Nicaragua declared model country in ] 
medical attention’ by OAS (1983) !
PUBLIC H I  LL ARE
Child cuie centers 
Rural infant care centers 
Soup kitchens for urban children 
Homes for the elderly 
Programs for refugees 
Rehabilitation centers
4
none 
none 1
none 
data unavailable
25
24
32
41
Social security only available in Managua 929 909 participants nationwide
ECONOMY
Gross Domestic Product 
Rate of investment 
Food Supply 
food distribution centers
7 2 percent (1978)
18 2 ptreent (1975 77) 
uncontrolled 
322
5 3 percent (1983)
21 3 percent (198U3) 
106 popular supply centers
AGRICULTURAL SECTOR 
Large landholding*.
Peasant landholdings 
Ags icultural cooperatives 
Co op farmers
50 percent of arable lands 
3 percent of arable lands 
27 
1,240
13 percent of arable Linds
14 percent of arable lands
3 000 
70,000
LABOR ORGANISATION
Unions
Union members
133
27.000
1.103
207.291
HOUSING 
New housing units 
Land grants 
New property titles
data unavailable 
data unavailable 
data unavailable
11 496
12 648 
12.905
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MOTKS
Caribbean Basin is here defined as the thirty-two 
countries that are located in the Caribbean Sea and the 
Central American isthmus.
2If one compares this figure with the 25% unemployed 
in America during the great depression, the magnitude of 
Cuba's problems is better understood.
3Today, Castro even admits that he has little 
knowledge of Marx and Lenin. He prefers spontaneous 
decision making with little regard to Moscow party ideology.
4The Guatemalan affair in 1954, in which the IJ.S. 
'replaced' the socialist Arbenz with the American puppet 
Armas, wa*> a clear indication to the Soviets that Latin 
America was still U.S, territory.
sPresident Ortega of Nicaragua made a similar charge 
against the U.S. in October, 1984. When the U.S. did not 
invade as Ortega had predicted, the Nicaraguans reasoned that 
it was the U.N. prediction which hindered U.S. action.
6For insight into Soviet thinking, see Breaking with 
Moscow by Arkauy Shevchenko (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1485).
7OAS is the Organization of American States, set up 
to discourage unilateral actions in Latin America.
a
It is important to have in mind the Soviet struggle 
with the Chinese over the issue of Revolutionary tactics.
The Chinese pleaded for Guerilla warfare whereas the Soviets 
preferred a peaceful, political plan.
qRevolutions are not exportable subject-matter.
See page of quotations, in particular, Stalin's.
*^Our ill-founded fear3 in Vietnam never became 
reality? Castro failed in Venezuela and Bolivia.
^*A quote often attributed to Franklin D. Roosevelt.
121983 facts on Nicaragua (see also Appendices A, B).
Population: 2.7 million (most thinly populated in
area)
Area: 57,000 square miles (roughly size of
N. Carolina)
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Economy: depends on coffee, sugar, cotton, timber
exports
Illiteracy: 60 to 70 percent before 1979
Per Capita Income: $U.S. 897
^The 1980 massive literacy crusade was a success.
In five months, illiteracy was reduced from almost 50 percent 
to about 13 percent.
14Kissinger’s famous remark should be noted: "Diplo­
macy without force buries itself in its own rhetoric."
15Early May, 1985, 100 Cuban advisors went home as 
ordered by Nicaraguan officials.
16This argument, in a nutshell, summarizes the 
military lesson of Vietnam and third world nations; but I 
ask, should the problem have been considered military in 
nature? The criterion for rational policy should not be 
merely winning or losing.
17The growing influence of China and the third world 
in United Nation meeting is testimony to this claim.
18The collapse of the ruling party in Mexico, the 
P.R.I. (Institutionalized Revolutionary Party), is our real 
concern: subsequent immigration to the U.S. could reach
crisis proportions.
U.S. Embargo: (1) A halt to the purchase by the United States
of Nicaraguan products that were worth 
$57 million in 1984.
(2) A halt to United States exports to 
Nicaragua that totaled about $112 million 
last year.
(3) Suspension of service to the United 
States by Nicaraguan ships.
(4) A cancellation of landing rights in the 
United States by the Nicaraguan airline 
Aeronica.
This action was intended to counter ’Aggressive1 actions by 
the Sandinistas (N.Y. Times, May 1, 1985, p. 1).
Author's note: if the U.S. cuts off diplomatic links with
Nicaragua, the analogy to Cuba will be 
complete.
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